Die Konstruktion der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion wurde in der wissenschaftlichen und politischen Diskussion als fehlerhaft kritisiert: Besonders das Fehlen einer gemeinsamen Fiskalpolitik bei gemeinsamer Geldpolitik und Wegfall des Wechselkurses wurde als „Geburtsfehler“ bezeichnet.
Mit der Finanzkrise, die zu einer Euro-Krise oder gar Europa-Krise mutiert ist, gewinnt dieser Aspekt wieder an Aufmerksamkeit. Ein sehr gutes und übersichtliches Papier zu diesem Thema von Paul DeGrauwe befasst sich u.a. mit der fehlerhaft spezifizierten Rolle der Europäischen Zentralbank, die nach seiner Auffassung als „Lender of last Resort“ (Letzter Kreditgeber) fungieren sollte, so dass eine Panik an den Finanzmärkten nicht zur Illiquidität von Staaten führen kann (DeGrauwe, P. (2013): Design Failures in the Eurozone – can they be fixed?, in: European Economy, economic papers, 491, April; als PowerPoint).
Ähnlich:
- Dehesa, G. d. l. (2012): A Self-Inflicted Crisis? Design and Management Failures Leading to the Eurozone Crisis, in: Group of Thirty Occasional Paper, 86
Conclusion: „In sum, the three bailouts affecting some of the weakest member states in terms of solvency, and the expected two soft bailouts to other member states still solvent but with liquidity problems, have been triggered by eurozone design and management failures, which have created large uncertainties among investors and contagion among member states.
It may be that this is the only politically feasible way to walk slowly toward a future fiscal union, a single fiscal policy, and a banking union, but these series of failures in the eurozone design, governance, and management of the crisis have not been able to solve the current eurozone crisis, and they have proved extremely costly and painful for some member states and for many eurozone citizens.
The eurozone is in reality quite a closed economy compared to the rest of the world in the sense that is has no current account surplus or deficit, and all its members are in the same boat given that surpluses in some member states are the counterpart of deficits in other member states, and surplus members have financed their surpluses of exports of goods and services to the deficit countries. Moreover, the competitiveness of some members comes at the expense of the ompetitiveness of others.
These are the reasons why all member states together should be able to find a consensus and a more Cooperative way out of the current difficult situation to really try to stabilize the eurozone and the euro for good.“
- The Failure of the Euro. The Little Currency That Couldn’t, by Martin Feldstein, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2012,
Summary: The collapse of the euro is no accident; the seeds of the crisis were planted before the monetary union even began, argues a former chair of the Council of Economic Advisers. It never made sense to yoke so many different economies and cultures together—yet they now find themselves trapped in a union that leaves no means of escape.